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Abstract
Blind people's inferences about how other people see provide a window into fundamental 
questions about the human capacity to think about one another's thoughts. By working with blind 
individuals, we can ask both what kinds of representations people form about others’ minds, and 
how much these representations depend on the observer having had similar mental states 
themselves. Thinking about others’ mental states depends on a specific group of brain regions, 
including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). We investigated the representations of 
others’ mental states in these brain regions, using multivoxel pattern analyses (MVPA). We found 
that, first, in the RTPJ of sighted adults, the pattern of neural response distinguished the source of 
the mental state (did the protagonist see or hear something?) but not the valence (did the 
protagonist feel good or bad?). Second, these neural representations were preserved in 
congenitally blind adults. These results suggest that the temporo-parietal junction contains 
explicit, abstract representations of features of others’ mental states, including the perceptual 
source. The persistence of these representations in congenitally blind adults, who have no first-
person experience with sight, provides evidence that these representations emerge even in the 
absence of first-person perceptual experiences.
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Introduction
Imagine a friend tells you that last night, looking out the window onto a dark, rainy street, 
she saw her boyfriend get into a car with a strange woman, and drive away. Your reaction 
will depend on many inferences about her thoughts and feelings. You will recognize that she 
believes her boyfriend is being unfaithful, and feels betrayed. You might also note the 
source of her belief, and question how clearly she could see at a distance and in the dark. 
Perhaps she was mistaken about the man getting into the car, or about the driver; maybe the 
driver was actually her boyfriend's sister. Knowing how she got her information might 
strongly affect how you reason about her beliefs and experiences -- do you yourself believe 
that her boyfriend is being unfaithful? How strongly do you think she believes it? What is 
she likely to do next?
Now imagine that you are congenitally blind. Would your inferences be any different? 
Clearly, a blind adult would understand the emotional toll of discovering a lover's possible 
betrayal, but could a blind person make the same inferences about the visual source of the 
discovery? How much would a blind person understand about the experience of seeing a 
familiar person and a strange woman, from afar, in the dark?
Blind people's inferences about how other people see provide a window into a fundamental 
question about the human capacity to think about one another's thoughts: what are the 
mechanisms used to think about someone else's mind? One possibility is that we think about 
someone's experience by invoking our own relevant experiences and sensations. In this 
view, thinking about someone else's experience of seeing requires (among other things) a 
first-person experience of sight. In contrast, if people use an intuitive “theory” of mind, 
composed of relationships among abstract mental state concepts, to reason about others’ 
experiences, then experience of sight is not always necessary for reasoning about seeing. In 
many cases, these views are hard to disentangle; however, they predict different outcomes in 
blindness. If first-person experience is necessary to understand others’ experiences, blind 
people should have only a fragmentary, limited, or metaphorical understanding of seeing. By 
asking how blind individuals represent other's experiences of sight, we can place important 
limits on our theories of mental state inference: to what extent does theory of mind depend 
on the observer having had similar sensations, experiences, beliefs, and feelings as the 
target?
The first possibility is that people understand another's mind by trying to replicate it, by 
imagining themselves in a similar situation, or by re-experiencing a similar past event of 
their own lives. You would understand your friend's feelings of sadness by imagining your 
own feelings in response to a lover's betrayal, recreating in your emotional system a version 
of your friend's experience. Similarly, you would understand your friend's experience of 
seeing her boyfriend get into the car by recreating the visual scene in your own mind's eye 
(Gordon, 1989; Stich & Nichols, 1992). Understanding others’ minds thus depends on the 
observer having experienced a relevantly similar mental state to the target (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 1989; 2006; Gordon, 1989; Harris, 1992; Nichols, Stich, Leslie, 
& Klein, 1996; Stich & Nichols, 1992). Simulation-based accounts do not necessarily posit 
that people can only think about exactly those experiences that they themselves have had; 
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rather, mental state representation could be a composition of one's existing relevantly similar 
first-person experiences, composed flexibly to simulate a novel experience. Still, because 
simulation depends on similar experiences, the extent to which we can simulate the minds of 
others depends on “the interpersonal sharing of the same kind of neural and cognitive 
resources. When this sharing is limited (or even missing), people are not fully able (or are 
not able at all) to map the mental states or processes of others because they do not have 
suitable mental states or processes to reuse” (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011). Because 
congenitally blind people lack the mental states and processes involved in seeing, their 
representations of sight are predicted to be limited or unreliable.
Neuroimaging experiments provide evidence that first-person sensorimotor representations 
are “reused” during observation of others’ actions and sensations. Similar brain regions are 
recruited when experiencing physical pain compared to observing another person experience 
similar pain (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2005; Immordino-Yang, McColl, Damasio, & Damasio, 
2009; Singer et al., 2004); and when experiencing a tactile sensation compared to observing 
another person being touched in the same way (Blakemore, 2005; Keysers:2004dj Gazzola 
& Keysers, 2009). More importantly, neural activity during observation depends on the 
observer's own specific first-person experiences. For example, motor activation in dancers 
during observation of dance moves is enhanced for specific movements that the observers 
themselves have frequently executed (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & 
Haggard, 2005; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006). If this type 
of reuse extends to mental state representation, typical representations of other's experiences 
of seeing should depend on, or be profoundly affected by, having first seen yourself.
However, many authors (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 
1993; Saxe, 2005) have suggested an alternative mechanism for understanding other minds: 
namely, that people have an intuitive theory of other minds. An intuitive theory includes 
causal relations among abstract concepts (like beliefs and desires), and can be learned from 
many sources of evidence, not limited to first-person experiences. One source of evidence 
children could use to build a theory of mind is the testimony of others: verbal labels and 
descriptions of mental states and experiences, often including mental state verbs like think 
and see (Harris, 2002b; 1992). Thus a congenitally blind child, growing up in a world full of 
sighted people, might develop an intuitive theory that includes concepts of vision, to explain 
everyone else's behavior (e.g. reacting to objects at a distance) and testimony (e.g. saying “I 
see your toy on the top shelf!”). This intuitive theory would then allow a blind child to 
predict how a sighted person would act in a given environment, and what that person would 
be likely to infer based on what she could see.
To test these theories, we investigated how blind people think about sight. Observation and 
behavioral studies suggest that even young blind children know that other people can see 
with their eyes, and can understand basic principles of vision: e.g. that objects can be seen 
from a distance and are invisible in the dark (Bigelow, 1992; Landau & Gleitman, 1985; 
Peterson, & Webb, 2000). By adulthood, congenitally blind people know the meanings of 
verbs of sight, including fine-grained distinctions, such as the difference between verbs like 
peer, gaze, and gawk (Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Lenci, Baroni, Cazzolli, & Marotta, 2013, 
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Koster-Hale et al., in prep). Blind adults are thus sensitive to subtle distinctions in how 
sighted people gather information visually.
This behavioral evidence alone, however, cannot answer the question of whether a blind 
person uses the same cognitive mechanisms as a sighted person to understand sight. Any 
surface similarity between a blind and sighted person's verbal descriptions of sight could be 
the product of compensatory mechanisms in the blind. For example, some authors have 
suggested that blind people mimic the words used by sighted people, without being able to 
fully access their meaning (so-called “verbalisms,” Rosel, Caballer, Jara, & Oliver, 2005) or 
integrate them into their conceptual understanding. Thus, a blind person who hears the 
sentence “I saw my boyfriend getting into the car from the window,” may have only a 
limited or metaphorical understanding of the experience it describes.
This methodological challenge affords an opportunity for cognitive neuroscience: functional 
neuroimaging can provide an online, unobtrusive measure of ongoing psychological 
processes and thus offers an alternative strategy to ask if two groups of people are 
performing a cognitive task using similar or different mechanisms. Here we use 
neuroimaging to ask whether blind and sighted people rely on similar cognitive mechanisms 
when they reason about seeing.
Previous studies have shown that thinking about someone else's thoughts (including those 
based on visual experiences, Bedny et al 2009) increases metabolic activity in a specific 
group of brain regions often called the ‘mentalizing’ or theory of mind network. These 
regions include the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the precuneus (PC), and the bilateral 
temporal-parietal junction (TPJ), (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2009; Bedny, Pascual-Leone, & 
Saxe, 2009; Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, Baron-Cohen, & Consortium, 2011; Mason 
& Just, 2011; Rabin, Gilboa, Stuss, Mar, & Rosenbaum, 2010; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; 
Saxe & Powell, 2006; Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2010). However, very little is known 
about what aspects of mental states are represented in these brain regions. Mental 
experiences have many features, including the content (“boyfriend in stranger's car”), the 
valence (very sad), and the modality or source of the experience (seen from afar). Neurons, 
or groups of neurons, within theory of mind brain regions may represent any or all of these 
features. Thus, two important questions remain open. First, in sighted people, do neurons in 
any theory of mind region specifically represent the perceptual source of another person's 
belief? Second, if so, are similar representations present in blind people?
A powerful approach for understanding neural representation is to ask which features of a 
stimulus are represented by distinct subpopulations of neurons within a region. For example, 
within middle temporal visual, subpopulations of neurons that respond to visual stimuli 
moving orientations are spatially organized at a fine spatial scale. Although no individual 
fMRI voxel (which includes hundred of thousands of neurons) shows an orientation 
selective response, and therefore overall early visual cortex shows equal average magnitude 
of response to all orientations, it is possible to detect reliably distinct spatial patterns of 
response across cortex that do distinguish between orientations (Kamitani & Tong, 2006). 
This technique of looking for reliable spatial patterns of fMRI response within a brain 
region is called multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA; (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Kriegeskorte & 
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Bandettini, 2007; Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006). MVPA can reveal how stimulus 
categories are processed within a functional region (Peelen et al, 2006; Haynes & Rees, 
2006). MVPA has been successfully used to probe the neural basis of many different types 
of representation, including subjectively perceived directions of motion in ambiguous 
stimuli, semantic category, emotional affect, and intent when causing harm (Koster-Hale, 
Saxe, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Mahon & Caramazza, 2010; e.g., Norman et al., 2006; 
Peelen, Wiggett, & Downing, 2006; Serences & Boynton, 2007).
In the current context, we can ask if source modality (seeing vs hearing) is a relevant feature 
of that neural representation. If one set of neurons responds more to stories about seeing 
than hearing, while another (partially distinct) set responds more to stories about hearing 
than seeing, we have evidence that seeing and hearing are being represented in different 
ways in that brain region. Measuring the average magnitude of activity in theory of mind 
brain regions cannot be used to address this question, because the average magnitude may 
obscure distinct subpopulations of neurons within the regions. We therefore used multivoxel 
pattern analysis (MVPA) to look for differences in the neural response to stories about 
hearing and seeing.
In this study, we first asked whether stories about a someone else's hearing and seeing 
experiences evoke different spatial patterns of response within theory of mind brain regions 
in sighted individuals. Because very little is known about how theory of mind is represented, 
cognitively or neurally, this is itself a fundamental question about mental state 
representation. We then asked whether the same patterns are observed in congenitally blind 
people. Finding these patterns would provide support for the notion that blind individuals 
represent mental experiences of seeing in a qualitatively similar manner to sighted 
individuals. For comparison, we also tested whether theory of mind regions encode a feature 
of mental states that should not differ between sighted and blind people: the valence (feeling 
good versus bad).
Methods
Participants
Thirteen sighted members of the larger MIT community participated (8 women; mean age ± 
SD, 52 years ± 16), all with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Ten blind individuals 
participated (5 women; mean age ± SD, 50 years ± 7). Nine blind participants were born 
blind and one lost sight between the ages of 2 and 3 years. All blind participants reported 
having at most faint light perception and no pattern discrimination. None were able to 
perceive shapes, colors, or motion.
One blind participant was ambidextrous and one was left-handed; one sighted participant 
was left-handed. All were native English speakers and gave written informed consent in 
accordance with the requirements of the Institutional Review Board at MIT. Participants 
were compensated $30/hour for their time.
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Comparison to Bedny et al (2009)
These data have previously been published, analyzing the magnitude but not the pattern of 
response in each region, in Bedny et al (2009). Bedny et al (2009) found that theory of mind 
regions showed equally high responses to stories about hearing and seeing, in both sighted 
and blind participants. However, measuring the average magnitude across the entire region 
may obscure distinct subpopulations of neurons within a region. Specifically, the equally 
high magnitude of response to stories about seeing and hearing observed by Bedny et al 
(2009) is consistent with three possibilities: (i) neurons in theory of mind brain regions do 
not distinguish between hearing and seeing in blind or sighted people, (ii) distinct 
subpopulations of neurons within theory of mind brain regions respond to stories about 
seeing versus hearing in both sighted and blind participants, reflecting a common 
representation of the perceptual source of other's mental states, or (iii) distinct 
subpopulations of neurons respond to seeing versus hearing in sighted but not blind 
individuals, reflecting different representations in the two groups, depending on their first 
person experiences. The current analyses allowed us to distinguish between these 
possibilities.
Note that the current results exclude one blind participant who was included in the previous 
paper: this participant was born with cataracts and had some light and shape perception 
during the first ten years of his life. To be conservative, we exclude his data from the current 
analyses.
Finally, the previous paper included an analysis of reaction time to the behavioral portion of 
the task (judging how good or bad the protagonist felt at the end of the story), looking at the 
seeing events, hearing events, and additional control events, all collapsed across valence. In 
this paper, we are also treating valence as a dimension of interest in the neural data, and so 
break down the behavioral data by both modality and valence to report reaction time and 
rating data.
fMRI Protocol and Task
Participants heard 32 stories (each 13 sec long): four in each of eight conditions. Stories in 
the four conditions of interest described a protagonist's mental experiences, characterized by 
both a modality-specific source (something seen vs heard) and a modality-independent 
valence (whether the protagonist felt good or bad). The “seeing” stories described the 
protagonist coming to believe something as a result of a visual experience, such as seeing a 
friend's worried face or recognizing someone's handwriting. The “hearing” stories described 
the protagonist coming to believe something as a result of an auditory experience, such as 
hearing a friend's worried voice or recognizing someone's footsteps. The stories with 
negative valence described an event that would make the protagonist feel bad, such as 
receiving criticism or losing a game; the stories with positive valence described a good 
event, such as receiving praise or winning a game (Figure 1). The remaining four control 
conditions, which did not describe mental experiences, are not analyzed here (see Bedny et 
al., 2009 for details).
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For each narrative context (e.g. a job interview, dinner with parents-in-law, cleaning a dorm 
room), we constructed four endings, one in each condition. Thus the stories formed a 
matched and counterbalanced 2×2 (seeing vs hearing, positive vs negative) design. 
Individual participants saw each context only once; every context occurred in all conditions, 
across participants. Word count was matched across conditions (mean length ± SD, 32 
words ± 4). Stories were presented in a pseudorandom order, condition order was 
counterbalanced across runs and subjects, and no condition was immediately repeated. Rest 
blocks of 11 sec were presented after each story. Eight stories were presented in each 4 min 
34 sec run. The total experiment, four runs, lasted 18 min 18 sec.
After each story, participants indicated whether the main character in the story felt very bad, 
a little bad, a little good, or very good, using a button press (1-4). Reaction time was 
measured from the onset of each question.
Theory of Mind and Language Localizer task—Participants also completed a theory 
of mind and language localizer task. Participants listened to 48 short verbal stories from two 
conditions: 24 stories requiring inferences about mental state representations (e.g., thoughts, 
beliefs) and 24 stories requiring inferences about physical representations (e.g., maps, signs, 
photographs). These conditions were similar in their meta-representational and logical 
complexity but differ in whether the reader is building a representation of someone else's 
mental state (See Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003, Dodell-Feder et al. 2011, and Bedny et al., 2009 
for further discussion). After each story, participants answered a true/false question about 
the story. As a control condition, participants listed to 24 blocks of “noise,” unintelligible 
backwards speech created by playing the stories backwards. The task was performed in 6 
runs with 12 items per run (4 belief, 4 physical, and 4 backward-speech). Each run was 6 
min and 12 sec long. The stimuli for the localizer and both experiments were digitally 
recorded by a female speaker at a sampling rate of 44,100 to produce 32-bit digital sound 
files.
Acquisition and Preprocessing
fMRI data were collected in a 3T Siemens scanner at the Athinoula A. Martinos Imaging 
Center at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at MIT, using a 12-channel head coil. 
Using standard echoplanar imaging procedures, we acquired T1-weighted structural images 
in 128 axial slices with 1.33 mm isotropic voxels (TR = 2 ms, TE = 3.39 ms), and functional 
blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) data in 30 near-axial slices using 3x3x4 mm voxels 
(TR=2 s, TE=40 ms, flip angle=90°). To allow for steady state magnetization, the first 4 
seconds of each run were excluded.
Data processing and analysis were performed using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm) and custom software. The data were motion corrected, realigned, normalized onto a 
common brain space (Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template), spatially smoothed 
using a Gaussian filter (full-width half-maximum 5 mm kernel) and subjected to a high-pass 
filter (128 Hz).
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Motion and Artifact Analysis
To estimate motion and data quality, we used three measures for each participant: mean 
translation was defined as the average absolute translation for each TR across the x, y, and z 
plane; mean rotation was defined as the average absolute rotation per TR across yaw, pitch, 
and roll; and number of outliers per run was defined as the average number of time points 
per run in which (a) TR-to-TR head movement exceeded 2mm of translation, or (b) global 
mean signal deviated by more than three standard deviations of the mean. One blind 
participant moved excessively during the scan (mean translation of 1.2 mm, mean rotation of 
1.4 degrees, and mean outliers per run = 20.7, compared to other blind participants’ means 
of 0.33 mm of rotation, 0.35 degrees of rotation, and 2.5 outliers), so his results were 
dropped from the analyses.
fMRI Analysis
All fMRI data were modeled using a boxcar regressor, convolved with a standard 
hemodynamic response function (HRF). The general linear model was used to analyze the 
BOLD data from each subject, as a function of condition. The model included nuisance 
covariates for run effects, global mean signal, and an intercept term. A slow event-related 
design was used. An event was defined as a single story, the event onset was defined by the 
onset of the story sound file, and offset as the end of the story.
Functional Localizer—Individual subject ROIs In each participant, functional regions 
of interest (ROIs) were defined in right and left temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ, LTPJ), 
medial precuneus (PC), dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC3), and ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC3). Each subject's contrast image (Belief > Photo) was masked 
with each of the regions’ likely locations, using probabilistic maps created from a separate 
dataset.The peak voxel that occurred in a cluster of 10 or more voxels significant at p<0.001 
was selected. All voxels within a 9mm radius of the peak voxel, individually significant at 
p<0.001, were defined as the ROI.
Within-ROI Pattern Analysis—Split-half correlation-based MVPA asks whether we can 
find evidence that the neural pattern in a region is sensitive to a category-level distinction. 
Specifically, we ask whether the neural patterns generated by items within a condition are 
more similar to each other (“within-condition correlation”) than to the neural patterns 
generated by items in the other conditions (“across-condition correlation”). If we find that 
within-condition correlations are reliably higher than across-condition correlations, we can 
conclude that there are reliable neural pattern generated by difference items within a 
condition, and that these neural patterns are distinct from one condition to another. Together, 
this suggests that the region is sensitive to the category distinction -- items within a category 
are coded in a similar way, with distinguishable codes for different categories.
Here, we conducted within-ROI pattern analyses, independently testing for information 
about belief source and valence in the regions identified in the independent functional 
3Note that in Bedny et al., 2009, DMPFC was called SOFC, and VMPFC was called OFC.
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localizer. To compare seeing and hearing beliefs, we collapsed across good and bad valence; 
to compare good and bad valence, we collapsed across seeing and hearing.
Following Haxby et. al. (2001), each participant's data were divided into even and odd runs 
(‘partitions’) and then the mean response (beta value) of every voxel in the ROI was 
calculated for each condition. Because each participant read 8 stories about hearing, seeing, 
feeling good, and feeling bad, each partition contained the average response to 4 individual 
stories. The “pattern” of response was the vector of beta values across voxels within the 
participants individual ROI. To determine the within-condition correlation, the pattern in 
one (e.g. even) partition was correlated with the pattern for the same condition in the 
opposite (e.g. odd) partition; to determine the across-condition correlations the pattern was 
compared to the opposite condition, across partitions (Figure 2).
For each condition pair (e.g. seeing vs. hearing) in each individual, an index of classification 
was calculated as the within-condition correlation (e.g. the correlation of one half of the 
seeing stories to the other half of seeing stories, averaged with the correlation of one half of 
the hearing to the other half of hearing stories) minus the across-condition correlation (e.g. 
the correlation of seeing stories compared to hearing stories). To allow for direct comparison 
of correlation coefficients, we transformed all r values using Fisher's Z transform. A region 
successfully classified a category of stimuli if, across individuals, the within-condition 
correlation was higher than the across-condition correlation, using a Student's T 
complementary cumulative distribution function.
This procedure implements a simple linear decoder. Linear decoding, while in principle less 
flexible and less powerful than non-linear decoding, is preferable both theoretically and 
empirically. A non-linear classifier can decode nearly any arbitrary feature contained 
implicitly within an ROI, reflecting properties of the pattern analysis algorithm rather than 
the brain, which makes successful classification largely uninformative (Cox & Savoy, 2003; 
DiCarlo & Cox, 2007; Goris & Op de Beeck, 2009; Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Norman et al., 
2006). Moreover, linear codes have been argued to be a more neurally plausible way of 
making information available to the next layer of neurons (Bialek, Rieke, Van Steveninck, 
& Warland, 1991; Butts et al., 2007; DiCarlo & Cox, 2007; Naselaris, Kay, Nishimoto, & 
Gallant, 2011; Rolls & Treves, 2011).
Whole Brain Pattern Analysis (Searchlight)—In the searchlight analysis, rather than 
using a predefined ROI, a Gaussian kernel (14mm FWHM, corresponding approximately to 
the observed size of the functional ROIs) was moved iteratively across the brain. Using the 
same logic as the ROI-based MVPA, we computed the spatial correlation, in each kernel, of 
the neural response (i.e. betas) within conditions and across conditions. We then transformed 
the correlations using Fisher's Z, and subtracted the across-condition from the within-
condition correlation to create an index of classification. Thus, for each voxel, we obtained 
an index of how well the spatial pattern of response in the local region (i.e. the area centered 
on that voxel) can distinguish between the two conditions. The use of a Gaussian kernel 
smoothly de-emphasizes the influence of voxels at increasing distances from the reference 
voxel (Fedorenko, Nieto-Castañón, & Kanwisher, 2012). We created whole brain maps of 
the index of classification for each subject. These individual-subject correlation maps were 
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then subjected to a second-level analysis using a one-sample t-test (thresholded at p<0.001, 
voxelwise, uncorrected).
Results
Behavioral
Sighted participants—We performed a 2×2 ANOVA, crossing valence (good/bad) and 
modality (seeing/hearing), on both goodness ratings and reaction time data. Using a 1 (very 
bad) to 4 (very good) scale, sighted participants rated protagonists who experienced positive 
events as feeling better than the protagonists experiencing negative events, with no effect of 
modality and no interaction (hearing-bad: 1.84±0.14, hearing-good: 3.43±0.14, seeing-bad: 
1.88±0.12, seeing-good: 3.65±0.11; main effect of valence: F(1,12)=223, p<0.001, partial 
η2=0.79; modality: F(1,12)=1.2 p=0.3, partial η2=0.02; modality by valence interaction: 
F(1,12)=0.4, p=0.5, partial η2=0.01).
Sighted participants showed small, but significant effects of condition on reaction time 
(measured from onset of the question), with a marginal main effect of modality and a small 
but significant interaction (hearing-bad: 5.63±0.23, hearing-good: 5.2±0.21, seeing-bad: 
5.03±0.3, seeing-good: 5.28±0.23; main effect of modality: F(1,12)=4.4, p=0.06, partial 
η2=0.02; valence: F(1,12)=0.3, p=0.5, partial η2<0.01; modality by valence interaction: 
F(1,12)=6.8, p=0.002, partial η2=0.04). Post-hoc t-tests reveal that sighted participants 
responded more slowly to stories about negative experiences based on hearing than based on 
seeing (t(12)=3.3, p=0.007); there was no effect of modality on responses to positive events 
(t(12)=0.47, p=0.65).
Blind participants—Congenitally blind participants also rated protagonists in positive 
stories as feeling significantly better than those in negative stories, with no effect of 
modality and no interaction (hearing-bad: 1.81±0.15, hearing-good: 3.51±0.13, seeing-bad: 
1.95±0.25, seeing-good: 3.43±0.11; main effect of valence: F(1,8)=72, p<0.001, partial 
η2=0.72; modality: F(1,8)=0.02, p=0.9, partial η2 <0.01; modality by valence interaction: 
F(1,8)=0.5, p=0.5, partial η2<0.02).
In reaction time of the blind adults, there were no significant effects of modality or valence, 
and no interaction (hearing-bad: 5.51±0.35, hearing-good: 5.02±0.41, seeing-bad: 
5.47±0.33, seeing-good: 5.64±0.3; all F<3.1, all p>0.1).
Across Groups—We found no differences in the ratings across groups. We performed a 
2×2×2 repeated measures ANOVA crossing valence and modality as within-subjects factors 
with group (blind/sighted) as a between-subjects factor. All participants rated the protagonist 
as feeling worse in the negative valence stories (F(1,20)=264, p<0.001, partial η2=0.76), 
with no main effect of modality or group, and no interactions (all F<1, p>0.3).
In the reaction time data, there were no main effects of modality, valence, or group (all F<1, 
p>0.4). We found a small but significant modality by valence interaction (F(1,20)=7.0, 
p=0.02, partial η2=0.03): participants responded more slowly to stories about negative 
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experiences based on hearing than seeing; and more slowly to stories about positive 
experiences based on seeing than hearing.
There was also a small group by modality interaction (F(1,20)=7.4, p=0.01, partial η2=0.02): 
Sighted adults respond faster than blind adults to stories about seeing; blind adults respond 
faster than sighted adults to stories about hearing. Post-hoc t-tests comparing groups within 
modality (e.g. RTs of blind vs sighted for seeing stories) revealed no differences in reaction 
time between groups in either modality (all t<1.1, all p>0.2).
fMRI results
Motion and Artifact Analysis Results—Sighted participants and blind participants 
showed no difference in the mean translation per run (sighted mean + sd = 0.22mm ± 0.03, 
blind = 0.23mm ± 0.04), t(20)=0.13, p=0.9), mean rotation per run (sighted = 0.26 degrees ± 
0.04, blind = 0.24 ± 0.04, t(20)=0.37, p=0.71, or the mean number of outliers per run 
(sighted = 0.98±0.46, blind = 0.53±0.35, t(20)=0.72, p=0.48) Together, these data suggest 
the groups were well matched in motion and scanner noise.
Localizer—Replicating many studies using a similar functional localizer task (e.g. Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003), we localized five theory of mind brain regions showing greater activation 
for false belief stories compared to false photograph stories in the majority of participants 
(uncorrected, p<0.001, k>10): Sighted participants: RTPJ 13/13 participants, LTPJ, 12/13, 
PC 13/13, DMPFC 11/13, VMPFC 11/13; Blind participants: RTPJ 8/9 participants, LTPJ 
9/9, PC 9/9 and DMPFC 9/9, VMPFC 9/9 (Figure 3A). As reported in (Bedny et al., 2009), 
sighted and blind participants did not differ in the activation or anatomical loci of any active 
regions (all p>0.1), nor did blind participants show more variability in spatial location or 
size of ROIs.
Within ROI Pattern Analysis
Sighted participants
Source (seeing vs. hearing): Multi-voxel pattern analyses revealed reliably distinct patterns 
of neural activity for stories about seeing versus hearing in the RTPJ and LTPJ, but not PC, 
DMPFC, or VMPFC, of sighted adults. Note that correlations are Fisher Z transformed to 
allow statistical comparisons with parametric tests. Across partitions of the data, the pattern 
generated by stories in one category (seeing or hearing) was more correlated with the pattern 
for the same category than with the pattern for the opposite category, in the RTPJ (within 
condition correlation ± standard error, z=1.1±0.2, across condition correlation, z=0.95±0.2, 
t(12)=2.0, p=0.03) and LTPJ (within = 0.82±0.2, across = 0.64±0.2, t(11)=2.0, p=0.04), but 
not in the PC (within = 0.86±0.2, across = 0.78±0.2, t(12)=0.93, p=0.19), DMPFC 
(within=0.7±0.1, across=0.5±0.2, t(10)=1.2, p=0.12) or VMPFC (within = 0.58±0.2, across 
= 0.47±0.2, t(10)=0.75, p=0.23, Figure 3B, Table 1).
To test whether the difference between ROIs itself was significant, we conducted a 1x5 
repeated measures ANOVA. Because baseline differences in correlations across ROIs are 
hard to interpret (higher overall correlation in one region compared to another could be due 
to many factors, including the distance of a region from the coils, amount of vascularization, 
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or region size; see Smith, Kosillo, & Williams, 2011), we used difference scores (within 
condition correlation - across condition correlation) as the dependent variable. We found a 
main effect of ROI (F(4,28)=3.03, p=0.03, partial η2=0.27), suggesting that the regions 
contain varying amounts of information about source modality in their neural pattern.
Valence (good vs. bad): In no region did the pattern of response distinguish between good 
and bad valence (all correlation differences t<0.2, all p>0.1, Figure 3B).
Blind participants
Source (seeing vs. hearing): The pattern generated by stories within a condition were more 
correlated with other stories in the same condition compared to stories in the opposite 
condition in the RTPJ (within condition correlation ± standard error, z=1.1± 0.2, across 
condition correlation z=0.93±0.3, t(7)=2.0, p=0.04), but not in the LTPJ (within=1.3±0.3, 
across=1.3±.03, t(8)=0.2 p=0.4), PC (within=0.71±0.2, across=0.59±0.2, t(8)=1.3, p=0.12), 
DMPFC (within=0.83±0.2, across=0.73±0.1, t(8)=1.4, p=0.11) or VMPFC 
(within=0.56±0.2, across=0.34±0.2, t(8)=1.4, p=0.11, Figure 3C, Table 1). This difference 
between ROIs in discrimination was significant (F(4,28) = 4.0, p=0.01, partial η2 =0.36).
Valence (good vs. bad): As in sighted adults, the pattern of response in congenially blind 
adults did not distinguish between good and bad valence in any theory of mind region (all 
correlation differences t<0.2, all p>0.1, Figure 3C).
Across Groups
Source (seeing vs. hearing): Comparing across groups, we looked for three things: (a) a 
main effect of discrimination, driven by differences between the within-condition and 
across-condition correlations in that region: evidence of reliable discrimination between 
conditions; (b) a main effect of group, which indicates that one group has overall higher 
correlations, due to higher overall inter-trial correlations independent of condition (and thus 
not suggestive of interpretable group differences), and (c) an interaction between 
discrimination and group, such that one group shows a larger difference between the within- 
and across-condition correlations: evidence that one group shows more sensitivity to 
condition differences than the other.
Overall, we found that blind and sighted adults showed very similar neural patterns, with no 
evidence that either group was more sensitive to the distinction of seeing versus hearing. We 
found evidence of distinct neural patterns for seeing and hearing in both blind and sighted 
adults in the TPJ and no other regions. Specifically, blind and sighted participants show 
equally robust neural discrimination of seeing versus hearing in the RTPJ, with a main effect 
of discrimination (F(1,19) = 7.8, p=0.01, partial η2 = 0.3), no effect of group 
(F(1,19)=0.001, p=0.9), and, critically, no interaction (F(1,19)=0.02, p=0.89). There were no 
significant effects of group, discrimination, or their interaction in any other ROI. LTPJ 
showed a trend towards both a main effect of group (overall higher inter-trial correlations in 
blind participants, F(1,19)=3.2, p=0.09) and a main effect of discrimination (F(1,19)=3.6, 
p=0.07), with no interaction. Precuneus, DMPFC, and VMPFC showed no effects (PC: 
group: F(1,20)=0.5, p=0.5, discrimination: F(1,20)=2.3, p=0.14, interaction: F(1,20)=0.1, 
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p=0.7; DMPFC: group: F(1,18)=0.9, p=0.4, discrimination: F(1,18)=2.7, p=0.12, interaction: 
F(1,18)=0.3, p=0.6; VMPFC: group: F(1,18)=0.1, p=0.8, discrimination: F(1,18)=2.1, 
p=0.16, interaction: F(1,18)=0.3, p=0.6)
Valence (good vs. bad): We found no evidence of neural code distinguishing good valence 
from bad in any brain region of either group. Comparing patterns for valence, we found a 
main effect of group in the LTPJ (F(1,18)=5.1, p=0.04, partial η2=0.22), due to higher 
overall inter-trial correlations in the blind, independent of condition (and thus not suggestive 
of sensitivity to differences in valence). There were no significant effects of group, 
discrimination, or their interaction in any other ROI.
Whole Brain Pattern Analysis
Source (seeing vs. hearing)—The results of the searchlight converge with the ROI 
analyses, suggesting a representation of seeing and hearing in the RTPJ of both groups. 
Because of the similarity across groups in the ROI analyses, we combined the data from 
blind and sighted participants for increased power. Converging with the results of the ROI 
analyses, the whole brain analysis revealed that only the RTPJ distinguished between seeing 
versus hearing beliefs (n = 22, peak voxel at [60, −48, 12], p<0.001, uncorrected peak T = 
3.6).
Second, a two-sample T-test across groups revealed a significant group difference in the left 
dorsolateral PFC (BA45/46, peak voxel at [−58, 30, 8], p<0.001 uncorrected, peak T = 3.7). 
In this DLPFC region, sighted participants showed a greater difference between within and 
across condition correlations than blind participants. No regions showed stronger decoding 
in blind participants relative to sighted ones.
Valence (good vs. bad)—Combining across groups for power, we find that only the 
anterior cerebellum distinguishes between good and bad emotional valence (n = 22, peak 
voxel at [12, −42, −32], p<0.001 uncorrected, peak T = 4.2).
General Discussion
MVPA reveals features of mental state representations
For neuroimaging research to have cognitive implications, a key challenge is to go beyond 
where a cognitive function occurs in the brain, to provide a window into neural 
representations and computations. Dozens of neuroimaging studies suggest a hypothesis for 
where in the brain key aspects of theory of mind are processed (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2009; 
Bedny, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2009; Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, Baron-Cohen, & 
Consortium, 2011; Mason & Just, 2011; Rabin, Gilboa, Stuss, Mar, & Rosenbaum, 2010; 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Spunt, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2010). The 
right and left TPJ, the PC, and MPFC show increased hemodynamic responses to stimuli 
that require participants to think about other people's mental states, and many studies have 
investigated the selectivity and domain specificity of these brain regions for theory of mind. 
These brain regions therefore provide a prime opportunity to probe the neural computations 
of mental state representation: What features of people's beliefs and intentions are 
represented, or made explicit, in these brain regions?
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A powerful, if simplifying, assumption about neural representation is that a feature is 
explicitly represented by a population of neurons if that feature can be decoded linearly from 
the population's response. Different subpopulations of neurons within a region may 
contribute to a common task by representing different features or aspects of the stimulus or 
task. A well-studied example is object recognition in the ventral pathway of macaques. Low-
level features of the stimulus, like retinotopic position and motion energy, can be linearly 
decoded from the population response in early visual cortex, whereas higher-level 
properties, like object identity (invariant to size and position), can be linearly decoded from 
the population response in IT, a region further along the processing stream (DiCarlo et al. 
2012; Kamitani & Tong 2005).
We can take advantage of this property of neural populations to identify features of human 
neural representations using fMRI. When the subpopulations of neurons that respond to 
different stimulus features are at least partially organized into spatial clusters or maps over 
cortex (Dehaene & Cohen, 2007; Formisano et al., 2003), those features may be detectable 
in reliable spatial patterns of activity measurable with fMRI (Haynes & Rees, 2006; 
Kriegeskorte & Bandettini, 2007; Norman et al., 2006). Multi-voxel pattern analyses 
therefore offer an exciting opportunity for studying the representations underlying human 
theory of mind. In spite of many studies on the neural basis of theory of mind, very little is 
known about which features or dimensions of mental states are represented by the neural 
populations in the candidate brain regions. Here we identified two dimensions of others’ 
mental states that are common and salient: the source modality of the other person's 
experience, and the emotional valence. To ask whether either of these dimensions are 
explicitly represented in these brain regions, we then tested whether either of these 
dimensions could be linearly decoded from the spatial pattern of the response in any theory 
of mind brain region.
We found that both the right and left TPJ of sighted people showed distinct spatial patterns 
of responses to stories that described seeing versus hearing. Two independent groups of 
stories, similar only in the source modality of the character's beliefs, elicited reliably similar 
spatial patterns of response in the TPJ, in spite of the wide heterogeneity of the stories in 
many other respects (e.g. the physical environment, the type of event, the character's name, 
age, gender, social status, etc). Furthermore, we replicated these results in the right TPJ in an 
independent group of congenitally blind adults. We therefore suggest that spatially 
distinguishable neural populations in the TPJ explicitly represent the perceptual source of 
another person's mental states. Together with prior evidence, our findings suggest that these 
representations develop in the absence of first person experience.
Knowledge source and theory of mind
Why might the TPJ code the distinction between seeing and hearing mental states described 
in stories? One possibility is that the patterns of activation we observed were driven simply 
by a response to the mental state attitude verb used in the story (i.e. “sees” vs “hears”). 
However, we consider this interpretation unlikely, for three reasons. First, mental state verbs 
on their own elicit little to no response in the TPJ, both relative to rest and relative to non-
mental verbs (e.g. “to think” vs “to run” or “to rust,” Bedny, McGill, & Thompson-Schill, 
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2008). Robust responses are best elicited in TPJ by full propositional attitudes (e.g., a 
person's mental attitude to a state), ideally embedded in an ongoing narrative. Second, in 
previous research we directly manipulated the mental state verb in a sentence and did not 
find distinct patterns of response in TPJ (e.g. “believe” vs “hope”, Paunov and Saxe, 
personal communication). Third, in an other experiment, we found distinct patterns of 
response in TPJ for distinct mental states that were described using the same verb (i.e. 
intentional vs accidental harm, both described by “believed”, Koster-Hale et al 2013). In all, 
we suggest that the patterns of activity observed here are most likely responses to features of 
the character's mental state, rather than to specific verbs in the stories. Still, future research 
should test this possibility by independently manipulating the source of the mental state and 
the verb used to describe it, as well as by looking at the pattern evoked by these verbs 
outside of a mental state context.
Based on the current findings, we hypothesize that the TPJ contains an explicit 
representation of the perceptual source of mental states. Why might theory of mind brain 
regions code this information? Considering the source of others’ knowledge is central to 
inferences about other people's minds. Knowing how another person got their information 
can influence the inferences we make about what they know, how well they know it, and 
whether we should believe it ourselves. For example, we are more likely to trust another 
person's testimony if they acquired their knowledge by direct visual observation (an “eye-
witness”) than through gossip or hearsay (Bull Kovera, Park, & Penrod, 1992; Peter Miene, 
Bordiga, & Park, 1993; Peter Miene, Park, & Bordiga, 1992); eyewitness but not hearsay 
testimony is admitted as evidence in courts of law (Park, 1987). Similarly, recalling how one 
acquired one's own information plays an important role in evaluating and justifying a belief, 
and deciding how readily it should be discarded (O'neill & Gopnik, 1991).
Recognizing sources of knowledge is so cognitively salient that some languages explicitly 
mark source syntactically. In languages with evidential marking, such as Turkish, Bulgarian, 
Tibetan and Quechua, utterances are syntactically marked to indicate how the information 
was acquired (Aikhenvald, 2004; J. G. de Villiers, Garfield, Gernet-Girard, Roeper, & 
Speas, 2009; Faller, 2002; Fitneva, 2001; Johanson & Utas, 2000; Smirnova, 2012). Some 
languages mark direct versus indirect experience, or hearsay versus everything else; others 
mark whether the information was gained from inference, hearsay, or sensory experience. 
Languages such as Tucano and Fasu encode aspects of sensory modality, including 
distinctions between visual versus non-visual sensory information; one language, Kashaya, 
has a separate marker for auditory evidence (Aikhenvald, 2004). Acquisition of linguistic 
evidential marking by children appears to depend on the development of theory of mind: 
during acquisition of Turkish, for example, children's earlier performance on explicit theory 
of mind tasks concerning sources of knowledge predict their later comprehension of 
linguistic evidentials, but not vice versa (Papafragou & Li, 2001).
In sum, the source of others’ knowledge is both behaviorally relevant and cognitively 
salient; the current results suggest that it is also explicitly encoded by distinct neural 
populations within the TPJ. An open question for future work is whether patterns in the TPJ 
can distinguish only the modality or also other aspects of another person's source of 
knowledge. For example, sources of knowledge can be direct (perceptual observation), 
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inferential (by induction from clues or patterns), or from hearsay (from other people's 
report). Direct perceptual sources may be more or less reliable, depending on the situation 
(e.g. observed from nearby or at a distance, based on a quick glance or a long stare) and the 
observer (e.g. an expert, an amateur, or a child). Future research should investigate the 
neural representation of these other features of knowledge source, and the relationship 
between these features and perceptual source.
The valence of others’ mental states
In contrast to perceptual source, we failed to decode the valence of another person's mental 
experience from the pattern of activity in any theory of mind region. This is especially 
noteworthy, considering that the behavioral task -- judging how good or bad someone felt at 
the end of the story -- specifically drew attention towards valence, while ignoring source 
information. However, a prior study successfully decoded positive versus negative valence 
of others’ emotions, expressed in emotional body movements, facial expressions, and tones 
of voice, from patterns of activity in MPFC (Peelen, Atkinson, & Vuilleumier, 2010). One 
possibility is that emotional experience is more effectively conveyed in non-verbal stimuli. 
However, null results from MVPA should be interpreted with caution. The neural sub-
populations that respond to different types of valence could be intermingled such that we 
would be unable to detect the distinct neural populations at the spatial scale of fMRI voxels; 
the distinction would only be revealed by techniques with higher spatial resolution.
Blind adults represent knowledge source
We found similar patterns of neural activity in blind and sighted adults. Most notably, we 
found that other people's visual versus auditory experiences are encoded distinctly by both 
sighted and blind adults. Blind individuals specifically lack first person experience of visual 
aspects of mental states, and thus allow us to test the role of first person, sensory experience 
in the development of theory of mind representation: what does it take to be able to think 
about someone else's experience?
One set of theories of how we understand others’ mental experiences posits that we vividly 
simulate, or imagine, having the same experience ourselves. For example, Gallese & 
Sinigaglia (2011) describe the process of simulation as follows: “People reuse their own 
mental states or processes in functionally attributing them to others, where the extent and 
reliability of such reuse and functional attribution depend on the simulator's bodily resources 
and their being shared with the target's bodily resources.” (p. 518). That is, we understand 
other people's mental states using a template of our own first-person experiences. This view 
is difficult to reconcile with evidence that blind people use similar neural mechanisms to 
reason about seeing as do sighted people. In the initial analyses of these data, Bedny et al. 
(2009) showed that blind adults can represent mental states acquired by vision, without 
additional costs or compensatory mechanisms. The present analyses further show that in 
these same blind and sighted adults, not only are the same brain regions recruited to think 
about others’ mental states based on seeing and hearing, but these regions represent the 
difference between visual and auditory perceptual sources. These results suggest the 
representation of perceptual source in the TPJ is not dependent on first-person experience.
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Importantly, however, our data do not show that people never use first-person experience to 
make inferences about other people's minds and goals. Both in the motor and sensory 
domains, people do seem to use sensory-motor information to understand other's actions and 
experiences. For example, interference between other people's sensory-motor experience and 
our own suggests that we use partially shared representations for action observation and 
action execution. Observing someone else's actions can interfere with executing actions 
yourself (Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003), and observing what another person can 
see interferes with the ability to report on what you yourself are seeing (Samson, Apperly, 
Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010). Similarly, personal experience specifically 
helps children learn about others’ visual experiences: infants who experienced a transparent 
blindfold follow the gaze of a blindfolded adult, but infants who experienced an opaque 
blindfold do not (Meltzoff, 2004; 2007; Meltzoff & Brooks, 2007).
In all, understanding of other minds is likely guided by both first-person experience, which 
provides rich and detailed input about the character of specific experiences, and an intuitive 
theory of mind, which allows individuals to form representations of experiences they have 
not had, and indeed could never have, such as blind adults’ representations of experiences of 
sight. In some cases, such as action prediction, first person sensory machinery may play a 
direct role in representing information about other people; in other cases, first person 
experience provides a rich source of data about how people feel and act, playing an 
important role in building causal theories of other's minds. The best “theory of mind” will 
both be able to deal with abstract generalizations and make use of data from first-person 
experience (Apperly, 2008; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Kilner & Frith, 2007).
Learning about sight
The present findings, along with prior evidence, suggest that blind people can have 
impressively rich knowledge about sight (Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Marmor, n.d.; Shepard 
& Cooper, 1992). How do blind individuals acquire this extensive knowledge about seeing? 
We propose that one source of information is others’ testimony. Blind children live 
immersed in a world of sighted people, who talk constantly about experiences of seeing. In 
general, children acquire much of their knowledge of the invisible causal structure of the 
world through testimony (Harris, 2002a; 2002b; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Koenig, Clément, 
& Harris, 2004). Language and testimony are a particularly powerful tool for learning about 
the invisible contents of other minds (Bedny & Saxe, 2012; Robinson & Whitcombe, 2003; 
Robinson, Haigh, & Nurmsoo, 2008; Urwin, 1983); the absence of linguistic access to other 
minds can significantly delay theory of mind development, for example in deaf children 
born to non-signing parents (Figueras-Costa & Harris, 2001; Meristo et al., 2007; de 
Villiers, 2005; Moeller & Schick, 2006; Peterson & Wellman, 2010; Peterson & Siegal, 
1999; Pyers & Senghas, 2009; Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers, & Hoffmeister, 2007; Woolfe 
& Want, 2002). In contrast, conversational access seems to give blind children a detailed 
representation of visual mental states, and the inferences they afford.
On the other hand, these experiments have just begun to probe sight understanding in blind 
individuals. In the current stimuli (and unlike our initial example of the woman at the 
window) neither the content nor the reliability of the mental states depended on the 
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perceptual modality. The belief content (e.g. “his team lost”) was matched across perceptual 
sources, and always reliably inferred from the perceptual evidence. Thus, successfully 
encoding the story did not depend on specific knowledge about sight, e.g., how difficult it is 
to recognize a face in the dark. It is possible that blind people would show different behavior 
and neural processes for such inferences. Additionally, participants’ task (judging how good 
or bad the protagonist would feel) depended on encoding the content but not the source of 
beliefs. Despite this, participants spontaneously encoded the perceptual source of the belief 
described in the story. However, as a consequence, the current results cannot determine 
whether blind and sighted people would show similar neural patterns (or behavioral 
performance) if specific details about the perceptual source were more relevant in the task. 
Future research should investigate whether blind and sighted adults have similar knowledge 
and representations of the details of sight, such as how knowledge based on vision will vary 
with distance, occlusion, and darkness, and whether the neural patterns observed here 
encode similar information about seeing and hearing. Such specific details may show greater 
influences of first person experiences.
The importance of testimony to the understanding of other minds is highlighted by the 
contrast between how much blind people know about sight and how little sighted people 
know about blindness. Blind individuals can never directly experience vision, but they are 
constantly exposed to testimony about seeing. By contrast, sighted people do experience the 
perceptual aspects of blindness (when in the dark or with their eyes closed). Nevertheless, 
the average sighted person has little understanding of blindness. Most sighted people do not 
know how blind individuals navigate their environment or perform daily tasks such as 
dressing and eating. This lack of knowledge can lead to incorrect and sometimes 
problematic inferences about blind people's incapability to work, learn, and parent. Given 
how much blind people know about seeing, such misunderstandings are unlikely to result 
from an in principle incapacity to understand experiences different from our own. While 
blind people are surrounded by sighted people, most sighted individuals have never met 
anyone who is blind. The ignorance of sighted people is thus another dramatic example of 
the importance of testimony for learning about other minds.
Finally, while the data here suggest a common endpoint in the development of an adult 
theory of mind, the processes by which blind and sighted children acquire this theory may 
be different. Although blind adults appear to have typical theory of mind, blind children are 
delayed on a variety of theory of mind tasks, including both tasks that rely directly on 
inferences about vision, such as perspective taking tasks (Bigelow, 1991; 1992; Millar, 
1976), and also tasks that do not depend directly on visual perspective, including auditory 
versions of the false belief task (McAlpine & Moore, 1995; Minter, & Hobson, 1998; 
Peterson et al., 2000). Using a battery of theory of mind tasks designed specifically for blind 
children, Brambring & Asbrock (2010) concluded that blind children are delayed an average 
of 1-2 years, relative to blindfolded sighted control children, though these children catch up 
in adolescence (see Peterson & Wellman, 2010 for a similar argument about deaf children). 
Thus an open question is whether the neural mechanisms for theory of mind, which are 
similar in blind and sighted adults, develop differently in blind and sighted children.
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Conclusion
In summary, we find that (i) theory of mind brain regions (specifically, the TPJ) encode 
perceptual source and sensory modality of others’ mental states, and (ii) these 
representations are preserved in the RTPJ of congenitally blind adults. Considerable 
neuroimaging work on theory of mind suggests that the RTPJ plays a role in thinking about 
others’ thoughts; we find that one aspect of this role is to make explicit, in the population 
response of its neurons, features of beliefs -- in this case, the perceptual source of the belief. 
The persistence of these representations in congenitally blind adults, provides evidence that 
theory of mind brain regions come to encode these aspects of mental states even in the 
absence of first-person experience.
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• We use multivoxel pattern analysis to explore the neural basis of theory of mind.
• We decode the perceptual source (hearing vs. seeing) of others’ mental states.
• These representations of perceptual source are preserved in congenitally blind 
adults.
• Representations of others’ mental states are not fundamentally derived from 
first-person experiences.
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Figure 1. 
Sample stimuli.
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Figure 2. Split half MVPA analysis
The data from each condition (e.g. hearing and seeing) were divided by run, and for each 
participant, we asked whether the within condition correlations (blue arrows) were higher 
than the across conditions correlations (grey arrows). Data from one blind participant: 
within-condition correlation = 1.3; across-condition correlation = 0.8.
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Figure 3. MVPA results
(A) Canonical theory of mind brain regions; for all analyses, theory of mind brain regions 
were individual defined in each participant. (B) Sighted adults (n=13) show pattern 
discrimination for beliefs based on seeing vs. hearing in the right and left TPJ, but not in any 
other theory of mind region. (C) These representations of seeing and hearing persist in the 
RTPJs of blind adults (n=9).
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Table 1
Z scores for within versus across condition comparisons of seeing and hearing.
Region Within Across Significance
Sighted RTPJ 1.1±0.2 0.95±0.2 t(12)=2.0, p=0.03*
LTPJ 0.82±0.2 0.64±0.2 t(11)=2.0, p=0.04*
PC 0.86±0.2 0.78±0.2 t(12)=0.93, p=0.19
DMPFC 0.7±0.1 0.5±0.2 t(10)=1.2, p=0.12
VMPFC 0.58±0.2 0.47±0.2 t(10)=0.75, p=0.23
Blind RTPJ 1.1± 0.2 0.93±0.3, t(7)=2.0, p=0.04*
LTPJ 1.3±0.3 1.3±.03 t(8)=0.2 p=0.4
PC 0.71±0.2 0.59±0.2 t(8)=1.3, p=0.12
DMPFC 0.83±0.2 0.73±0.1 t(8)=1.4, p=0.11
VMPFC 0.56±0.2 0.34±0.2 t(8)=1.4, p=0.11
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